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PREFACE 
Many of today's most significant socioeoonomic problems, mch as slower 
economic growth, the decline of some established industries, and shifts in patterns 
of foreign trade, are intermational o r  transnational in nature. But these problems 
manifest themselves in a variety of ways; both the intensities and t h e  peroeptions 
of the problems differ from one country to another, so  that intercountry compam- 
tive analyses of reoent h i s t o r i d  developments are neoessary. Through these 
analyses w e  attempt to identify the underlying processes of economic strvctural 
change and formulate useful hypotheses conoerning future developments. The 
understanding of these processes and future prospects provides the focus for 
IIASA's project on Comparative Analysis of Economic Structure and Growth. 
Our research concentrates primarily on the empirical analysis of interre- 
gional and intertemporal eoonomic structuml change, on the sources of and con- 
straints on economic growth, on problems of adaptation to sudden changes, and 
espeoially on problems arising from changing patterns of international trade, 
resource availability, and technology. The project relies on IIASA's accumulated 
expertise in related fields and, in partioular, on the data bases and systems of 
models that  have been developed in the reoent past. 
In this paper, Mitsuo Saito and Ryoichi Nishimiya use an interindustry model 
to examine strnctuml change in the Soviet economy during the  1970s. Their 
supply-oriented model u t i k e s  input-output data and national inmme acoounts for  
the Soviet Union covering the period 1950-79; with the help of the  econometric 
model, they study the oauses of changes in the rates of growth in the Soviet econ- 
omy during the seventies in comparison with those of the  fifties and sixties. In 
oertain of their  findings, Saito and Nishimiya interpret as " t eo h n i d  progress" a 
residual term in linear homogeneous produotion functions: these partioular results 
should be treated with some caution. 
Anatoll Smyshlyaev 
Roject Leader 
Comparative Analysis of 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE SOYIET ECONOMY 
DURING TAE 1970se 
Mitsuo Saito and Ryoichi Nishimiya 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since t h e  1973 oil crisis, t h e  market-economy countr ies  have exper ienced an 
overal l  set-back in business activit ies,  and economists have focused par t i cu la r  
attention on analyzing t h e  repercussions  of t h e  oil p r i c e  rise on t h e  economy as a 
whole. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, during t h e  1970s t h e  centrally-planned countr ies  also 
experienced a check  on t he i r  economic growth, possibly due  t o  causes  different 
from those affecting t h e  market-economy countries.  The ave rage  growth of Soviet 
net  material  product fell  from 7.1 percen t  in 1966-70 t o  5.1 percen t  in 1971-75 
and f u r t h e r  t o  3.9 percen t  in 1976-80. The slowdown in t h e  growth of agr icu l tu re  
was more pronounced; Soviet  agr icul tural  production in 1980 was only 10 percen t  
higher  than  t h e  1970 level due t o  extremely s e v e r e  climatic conditions. 1 
'The authors are very  grateful t o  A. Smyshlyaev, C. Kornai, C. Fink and the  s t a f f  o f  the 
IIASA project on "Comparative Analysis of Economic Structure and Growth" for valuable 
comments and advice. 
According t o  the estimates of  R.V. Greenlade (Lma Aeosures of Economic Growth and 
lkvelopment, 196040, Joint Economic Committee of the United States ,  December 1982), 
the  average growth rate of  Soviet  gross national product as  it i s  usually defined in 
western countries fell from 5.1 percent in 1961-70 t o  3.7 percent in 1971-75 and further t o  
2.7 percent in 1976-80. 
The main purpose of this paper  is t o  identify the causes of the  decline in the 
r a t e s  of growth in the  Soviet economy during the 1970s, and particularly during 
the la t te r  half of the  period. The method employed is to  examine the  occurrence 
of s t ructural  change in the equations of an  interindustry model of the  Soviet econ- 
omy, which was  previously estimated by one of the  authors  on the basis of annual 
time-series data f o r  1950-70.' 
Section 2 explains the  main features  of the  Soviet model. Sections 3, 4, and 5 
deal with the reestimation of the model f o r  the extended sample period 1950-79 
and discuss the  results. By and large, the estimates of the coefficients of the 
s tructural  equations turned out t o  be fairly stable, except f o r  a distinct change in 
the estimates f o r  the 1970s in the  r a t e  of technical progress within the  production 
functions. This suggests tha t  the main cause of the lower rates of growth recently 
observed may have been an overall slowdown in technical progress within Soviet 
industry. 
2. OUTLINE OF THE EODEL 
The model used he re  is a kind of interindustry model in which important com- 
ponents of final demand, such as household consumption and industry investment, 
a r e  t reated as endogenous variables. The basic data are time ser ies  of 
input-output tables and national income  account^.^ The original model in the 1978 
paper  was estimated from time ser ies  f o r  the  period 1950-70. 
In contrast t o  the demand-oriented models  appropriate  fo r  a market-economy 
country, the Soviet model is a supply-oriented model in which the  production and 
investment functions of individual industries constitute the central part .  Technical 
relations between capacity output and labor and capital inputs a r e  represented by 
production functions of the Cobb-Douglas type in which technical change is 
allowed f o r  by a time trend (see Section 3). The marginal productivity relationship 
' M .  Saito, An I n t e t t n d u s t q  Model of the S w i e t  Economy, Discussion Paper No.1, Kobe 
University,  Faculty o f  Economics (1978). 
For an explanation o f  the combined accounting scheme using national income accounts to- 
gether with input-output sys tems,  and the associated economic modeling, see L. R. Klein, 
Lectures i n  Econometrics (North-Holland Publishing Co., 1983 ), pp. 21-36. 
w a s  not utilized in t h e  estimation of these  functions, s ince i ts  adoption is  prob- 
lematic f o r  a centrally-planned economy. 
The investment functions are based on t h e  acce l e r a to r  principle.  Another 
explanatory var iable  is t h e  r a t i o  of actual  t o  capacity output f o r  t h e  machinery 
industry, which r ep re sen t s  a supply shor tage  in investment goods (see Section 4). 
I t  is t r u e  t h a t  decisions on new investment in t h e  Soviet economy are substantially 
influenced by t h e  intentions of t h e  planning author i t ies  in providing long-term 
structural adjustments r a t h e r  than by short-term demands from the  firms. How- 
e v e r ,  even if t h e  planners  wished to make t he  whoLe economy function well f o r  a 
longer per iod,  it would b e  impossible t o  neglect  completely t h e  requirements f o r  
new investment in individual industries str iving t o  maintain t he i r  achievement of 
output t a rge t s .  As  long as t h e  planning author i t ies  respond to such demands by 
allocating app rop r i a t e  amounts of funds, t h e r e  must ex i s t  a significant relationship 
between new investment and output increases  in t h e  Soviet  economy. 
The actual  output level of each industry is a function of both i t s  capacity out- 
put  and a var iable  represent ing any supply shor tages  of materials it uses. 
Components of final demand o the r  than pr iva te  consumption and investment 
are t r e a t ed  as exogenous variables.  Total p r iva te  consumption i s  determined not  
by consumption function of t h e  Keynesian type but as t h e  di f ference between total 
actual  output and total final demand, excluding pr iva te  consumption. 
Finally, pr ivate  consumption expenditures f o r  individual items are explained 
in terms of to ta l  consumption and by a special  var iable  t r e a t e d  as a "supply shor-  
tage" var iable  f o r  each item (see Section 4). 
The explanatory effectiveness of t h e  model has  been tes ted through simula- 
tions, and t h e  resu l t s  show tha t  t h e  general  t r ends  of Soviet economic growth dur- 
ing t h e  1950s and 1960s a r e  t r a ced  ou t  tolerably well. 
The classifications of industries and consumption items used a r e  as follows: 
Indust  t i e s  
(1) Agriculture 
(2) Electric power 
(3) Coal products 
(4) Petroleum and gas 
(5) Ferrous metals 
(6) Nonferrous metals 
(7) Forest products 
(8) Paper  
(9) Construction materials 
(10) Chemicals 
(11) Machinery 
(12) Textiles and fu r s  
(13) Processed foods 
(14) Construction 
(15) Transportation and communication 
(16) Trade and distribution 
Consumption i t ems  
(1) Foods, o the r  than processed foods 
(2) Processed foods 
(3) Clothes 
(4) Consumer durables 
(5) Furniture 
(6) Household operation 
(7) Personal services 
( 8 )  Health and education, materials 
(9) Health and education, wages 
3. THE PRODUCTION FTJNCTIONS 
We assume tha t  t he  technology of each  industry is  represen ted  by a 
Cobb-Douglas function with constant r e t u r n s  t o  scale:  
where 
&st  : capacity output in industry i 
L i l t  : normal l abor  input in industry i 
~ , f , ~  : average  capi ta l  stock in industry i 
t : time. 
The capacity output s e r i e s  i s  obtained by t racing smoothly t h e  peak-to-peak 
t rend  of t he  observed output values. Three-year moving averages  of actual  capital  
stock and employment are used as measures of capi ta l  input and l abo r  input, 
respectively.  
Differentiating equation (3.1) with r e s p e c t  t o  time and approximating time 
derivatives by f i r s t  differences,  w e  obtain a s tochast ic  equation: 
where 
Li , t  : employment in industry i 
: end-of-year capi ta l  stock in industry i 
uilt :stochastic term. 
The slope and in te rcep t  of t he  regress ion equation yield estimates f o r  ai and o f ,  
respectively.  The latter term is  in te rpre ted  h e r e  as "technical progress ,"  i.e. a 
residual term influenced by f ac to r s  not quantified in a production function. 
In the 19Y8 paper  cited ear l ie r ,  estimated results based on observations fo r  
1950-70 were presented, and these a r e  reproduced in rows denoted /o/ in T a b l e  
l. The main findings in tha t  paper were as follows: 
(1) There w a s  a break in the r a t e  of technical progress around 1960, mainly in 
the  investment goods industries. This break w a s  tested by using a dummy vari- 
able D l ,  which is zero  before the  period around 1960 and unity thereafter .  
(2) By and large, t he  estimates f o r  at and the capital sha re  of the  i t h  industry 
a r e  reasonably comparable, indicating the significance of cost minimization o r  
the efficient combination of capital and labor f o r  the Soviet economy. 
(3) Estimates of pi f o r  Soviet industries tended t o  exceed those fo r  the United 
States fo r  1946-1957, but fell shor t  of those f o r  Japan fo r  1955-63. 
Now we have reestimated the production functions of the same form fo r  the  
extended sample period, 1950-79. The results a r e  presented in rows denoted /e/ in 
T a b l e  1. Comparison of the +estimates (1950-68) and the  e-estimates (1950-79) 
reveals the  following points: 
(1) The estimates f o r  ai a r e  remarkably stable. Out of the  eleven industries 
examined, the difference between the o- and e-estimates is less than 0.05 in 
nine industries and around 0.1 in the remaining two. 
(2) There was a significant decline in the r a t e  of technical progress around 1975 
throughout industry as a whole. This w a s  taken into account in the  e-estimates 
by introducing a dummy variable 03, whose specification is given in the  foot- 
note below the  table. The coefficient of the dummy variable i s  negative in 
nine industries and significant in seven industries. This decline in the  r a t e  of 
technical progress  s ta r ted  somewhat ear l ie r  (in 1965) f o r  textiles and furs 
and in 1971 fo r  agriculture. The effect of 0 3  w a s  s o  substantial that  the  r a t e  
of technical change turned out to be practically zero  o r  even negative in most 
of the  industries. In particular,  the r a t e  of technical progress in agriculture 
w a s  found t o  be  -2.0 percent . However, looking at the  general behavior of 
the  r a t e  of technical change over  the  past thir ty years ,  the  situation a f t e r  
1975 seems t o  have been exceptional and temporary; therefore,  careful con- 
sideration wi l l  be  required before using 03 in forecasts of the  future perfor- 
mance of the  Soviet economy. 
TABLE 1. Estimates of Soviet Production Functions. 1950-79 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
di pi Dl D2 
(60-) (68-) (75-) 
(1) Agriculture /o/ 0.324 0.0394 -0.0325') 0.76 1.86 
(1.61) (2.36) (7.06) 
/e/ 0.308 0.0412 -0.0337') -0.00647 -0.0212 0.90 1.76 
(2.18) (3.44) (9.19) (1.56) (4.04) 
(2) Electric power /o/ 0.501 0.0492 -0.0471~ 0.34 1.48 
(1.58) (3.90) (2.99) 
/e/ 0.406 0.0521 -0.0466~) 0.0227 -0.0250~~ 0.46 1.82 
(2.12) (6.18) (4.21) (2.72) (1.74) 
(3) Coal products /o/ 0.627 -0.0032 0.78 1.95 
(7.64) (0.46) 
/e/ 0.611 -0.0000 -0.0329") 0.86 1.76 
(8.84) (0.01) (5.86) 
(5) Ferrous metals /o/ 0.465 0.0329 -0.0294 0.78 1.44 
(4.18) (3.07) (5.68) 
/e/  0.437 0.0354 -0.0282 -0.0165 0.86 1.76 
(5.19) (4.34) (7.26) (3.60) 
(7) Forest products /o/ 0.267 0.0316 -0.0317~ 0.69 1.57 
(2.27) (2.93) (5.60) 
/e/ 0.383 0.0216 -0.0343~ 0.0263 -0.0180~~~ 0.75 1.93 
(4.31) (2.64) (7.33) (5.09) (3.25) 
(9) Construction /o/ 0.151 0.0974 -0.0605~ 0.71 1.58 
materials (1.88) (7.96) (6.17) 
/e/ 0.198 0.0918 -0.0635~ -0.0232 0.82 1.46 
(3.50) (9.90) (8.32) (2.79) 
(10) Chemicals /o/ 0.411 0.0366 -0.0353 0.65 1.23 
(3.13) (2.65) (2.88) 
/e/ 0.412 0.0364 -0.0480 0.0414') -0.0255~~) 0.78 1.84 
(5.00) (4.16) (5.35) (4.88) (2.28) 
(11) Machinery /o/ 0.439 0.0603 -0.0397 0.73 1.60 
(2.19) (7.12) (6.61) 
/e/ 0.410 0.0613 -0.0392 0.0092~ 0.67 1.90 
(2.45) (8.57) (7.49) (1.62) 
(12) Textiles /o/ 0.494 0.0365 -0.0369~) 0.70 1.50 
and furs (4.54) (4.22) (5.08) 
/e /  0.493 0.0365 -0.0306~) -0.0163~ 0.83 2.20 
(7.51) (6.81) (6.15) (4.34) 
(13) Proceseed foods /o/ 0.450 0.0225 -0.0248~) 0.85 2.29 
(7.Q2) (4.47) (5.41) 
/e/ 0.442 0.0230 -0.0230q -0.0127~') 0.87 2.18 
(9.20) (5.33) (6.61) (2.70) 
(14) Construction /o/ 0.242 0.0556 -0.0409~ 0.38 2.45 
(1.40) (3.78) (3.13) 
/e/ 0.230 0.0562 -0.0440~ -0.0184~') 0.44 2.13 
(1.71) (4.66) (4.13) (1.75) 
(15) Transportation & /o/ 0.315 0.0795 -0.0411~ 0.55 2.42 
communication (0.77) (5.97) (3.14) 
/o/: 1950-68, /e/: 1950-79 
The years for which Dl - 1.0:l) after 1955, 2) after 1962, 3) after 1958, 
4) after 1957, 5) after 1961, 6) after 1956. 
The years for which 0 2  - 1.0:7) after 1971, 8) after 1967, 9) after 1965. 
The years for which 03 - 1.0:10) after 1978, 11) after 1976. 
(3) There was an increase in the r a t e  of technical progress around 1968 in indus- 
t r ies  such as electr ic  power, forest products, chemicals, and machinery. This 
was allowed f o r  by the  use of a dummy variable 02. 
4. THE INYEWENT FUNCTIONS 
The investment variable in our  function is net  investment, and the  explanatory 
variables a r e  output changes in cur rent  and preceding years: 
max [Y,,, - Yi, t - , .  01 and max CYi,t-l - % , t  -21 01 
where Yi,t is the  observed output of industry i in period t .  W e  assume tha t  the  
effects of output decreases on investment a r e  zero, since they a r e  not symmetric 
with the effects of output increases. Another explanatory variable tha t  is common 
t o  all the  industries is the  ra t io  of actual t o  capacity output in the  machinery 
industry. The key industries a r e  effectively supplied with a planned amount of new 
plant and equipment, irrespective of current  supply conditions regarding invest- 
ment goods. In a year  of supply shortage, however, this will be achieved by cur- 
tailing the allocation of new plant t o  less important industries. Therefore, the 
effect of this variable on new investment in an  industry will be significant and 
large fo r  the  less important industries, while i t  will be smaller in the  key indus- 
t r ies .  Thus, the  general form of the  investment function is: 
li,, = bil max Wilt - % , t  -1, 01 + biz max C%,t -1 - Yi,t -2, 01 
where 
Iitt : net investment in industry i in period t 
Sl l l t  : t h e  rat io of actual t o  capacity output in the machinery industry in 
period t 
utlt : s tochast ic  term. 
Estimated resu l t s  from t h e  1978 pape r  are reproduced in rows /o/ of Table 
2 . 4  The main findings were as follows: 
A substantial  p a r t  of t h e  movement of investment within Soviet  industry could 
b e  explained by t h e  accelerat ion principle represen ted  in equation (4.1). The 
sum of t h e  two coefficients of output change is regarded  as a long-run value of 
t h e  accelerator. A comparison between its estimated value and t h e  capital  
coefficient of each industry revealed t h a t  t h e r e  was a tendency f o r  t h e  long- 
r u n  accelerator of t h e  heavy and chemical industries to be  higher  than t h e  
capi ta l  coefficients, while t h e  long-run acce l e r a to r  of t h e  consumer goods 
industry w a s  lower than  t h e  corresponding capi ta l  coefficients. 
(2) Investments in t h e  heavy and chemical industries were less  affected by t h e  
supply shor tages  of machinery than those in o t h e r  industries;  in par t i cu la r ,  
investment in t h e  machinery industry was almost completely insensitive t o  
these  supply shor tages ,  reflecting t h e  fac t  t ha t  t h e  machinery industry is  
accorded t h e  highest  p r io r i ty  in t he  s t r u c t u r e  of Soviet  industry. 
The resu l t s  of t h e  reestimation of t h e  investment function (4.1) based on  t h e  
extended sample period,  1952-79, are shown in rows /e/ of Table 2. I t  can b e  seen  
that:  
(1) The e-estimates f o r  bt and bi2 , t h e  acce le ra to rs ,  are not so close t o  t h e  o- 
estimates as was t h e  case f o r  t h e  ai values in t h e  production functions. The 
e-estimates f o r  t h e  sum of bi and 2, however, are fa i r ly  comparable with, 
though smaller than,  t h e  corresponding o-estimates; t h e  former  i s  ove r  80 
percen t  of t h e  latter in six industries, and between 60 and 79 pe rcen t  in six 
o t he r  industries;  t h e  f igure  is 48 pe rcen t  f o r  f e r rous  metals. 
4 
/o/: 1952-71, /e/: 1952-79 
The years for which D l  - 1.0:l) after 1971, 2) after 1972, 3) after 1973, 4) after 1974 
The years for which 0 2  = 1.0:5) after 1976, 6) after 1977, 7) after 1978, 
8) 1979 i s  excluded, 9) 1971 i s  excluded, 
10) the coefficient of A K 4 J / ~ 4 t - I ~ 1 ~ S  = -3.21 (1-value - 2.85), 
11) the coefficient for the dummy (- 1.0 for 1960-70) - 0.241 (t-value - 5.62), 
12) 1970 i s  excluded 
TABLE 2. Estimates of Soviet Investment Functions. 1952-79 
(1) Agriculture /o/ 
/ e /q  
(2) Electric power /o/ 
/ e l@ 
(3) Coal products /o/ 
/e/'O> 
(4) Petroleum /o/ 
products 
/e/ll) 
(5) Ferrous metals /o/ 
/e/ 
(7) Forest  products /o/ 
(9) Construction lo/ 
materials 
/ e / e  
(10) Chemicals /o/ 
(11) Machinery /o/ 
(12) Texti les  /o/ 
and furs 
/e/  
(13) Processed foods /o/ 
(14) Construction /o/ 
(15) Transportation &/o/ 
communication 
/e/  
(16) Trade /o/ 
(2) The e-estimate f o r  d i 3  , the coefficient of the shortage variable, is compar- 
able both in magnitude and in t -value with the corresponding o-estimates over  
industry a s  a whole, implying long-term consistency in the priority o rde r  
assigned by the  planning authorities to  investment allocation. 
5. THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS 
In the 1978 paper ,  the  following consumption functions were estimated: 
where 
:consumption of item k 
Cft  : total consumption 
Nt : population over  1 6  years  of age  
wki : weight of t he  value of output i in the  value of consumption item k 
S f k  , t  : ra t io  of actual to  capacity output f o r  consumption item k . 
z k i  measures the  elasticity of an Engel curve. FkVt  represents  the  supply condi- 
tions f o r  a particular consumption item. If S'k,t is l o w  in a given year ,  consump- 
tion res t ra in t  on item k will be realized by a cutback in allocation. Therefore, ck2 
is expected to  have a positive sign. 
Estimation results of equation (5.1) based on the  sample period 1955-71 are 
reported in rows /o/ of Table 3. The main findings were as follows: 
(1) The total consumption elasticity of nonprocessed foods is below 1.0, while the  
total consumption elasticities fo r  other  items are all more than 1.0. The total 
consumption elasticity of total food consumption is 0.766; this value is la rger  
than estimates f o r  market-economy countries found by ear l ie r  researchers  
(about 0.5-0.6). 
TABLE 3. Estimates of Soviet Consumption Functions. 1955-79 
(1) Foods, other /o/ 
than processed 
foods /e/ 
(2) Processed /o/ 
foods 
/e/ 
(3) Clothes /o/ 
(4) Consumer /o/ 
durables 
/e/ 
(5) Furniture /o/ 
(6) Household /o/ 
operation 
/e/  
(7) Personal /o/ 
s erv i ce s  
/e/  
(8) Health and /o/ 
education 
materials 
(2') Foods: /o/ 
(1) + (2) 
/e/ 
(8') Health and /o/ 
education, 
materials plus / e l  
wages 
(1) 
t k  1 
total  
consumption 
0.443 
(31.8) 
0.434 
(41.6) 
1.420 
(32.6) 
1.284 
(39.3) 
1.121 
(72.7) 
1.152 
(135) 
2.453 
(35.3) 
2.782 
(53.4) 
2.399 
(0.64) 
2.244 
(18.3) 
1.309 
(30.3) 
1.430 
(49.0) 
1.664 
(51.2) 
1.646 
(93.2) 
1.076 
(22.7) 
(2) 
t k  2 
shortage index 
(3) 
%o 
const. 
(5) 
D.W. 
(2) A positive value f o r  the coefficient of the  supply shortage variable was 
obtained f o r  such items a s  nonprocessed foods, total foods, clothes, and furni- 
ture .  The supply shortage variable f o r  food items was significant when the 
rat io of actual t o  capacity output of agriculture with a one-year lag was used. 
Results of the reestimation of equation (5.1) based on the extended sample 
period, 1955-79, are given in rows /e/ of Table 3. I t  can be  easily seen from a 
comparison of the o- and e-estimates tha t  the two are remarkably close t o  each 
other.  Therefore, i t  may be concluded that ,  a s  far a s  broad consumption 
categories like those used he re  a r e  concerned, t he re  w a s  practically no struc- 
tural  change in consumption behavior within the Soviet economy, even in the  late 
1970s when the re  w a s  a general decline in the  rate of technical progress.  I t  is 
also interesting t o  note, as was found in the study fo r  1955-71, t ha t  the total con- 
sumption elasticity of total food consumption, 0.722, is on the high side when com- 
pared with corresponding findings f o r  market-economy countries, and tha t  the  sup- 
ply shortage played a n  important role in cutting back consumption expenditure f o r  
the relevant consumption item. 
6. CONCLUDKNG REXARKS 
Reestimation of the Soviet model using the  extended sample period, 1950-79, 
has revealed substantial stability in the  estimates fo r  the coefficients of the struc- 
tura l  equations. The new estimates fo r  the  capital elasticities of the  production 
functions are very close to  the previous estimates based on the years  1950-69. 
The new estimates fo r  the  long-run accelerator  of the  investment functions a r e  
fairly comparable with the  previous ones, though the former tend t o  be somewhat 
s m a l l e r  than the latter. There is practically no difference between the previous 
estimates and the  new ones fo r  t he  consumption functions. On the  o ther  hand, a 
distinct downward tendency in the r a t e  of technical progress is noticed a f t e r  
approximately 1970. These findings suggest tha t  the  recent  changes in the rates of 
economic growth a r e  due t o  an  overall slowdown in the  rate of a term interpreted 
as "technical progress" throughout the Soviet economy. 
